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ABSOLUTE v. RELATIVE, PRIORITY IN REORGANI-
ZATION: A RECONSIDERATION
DAVID G. TYNDALL
Introduction
In the long and stormy discussions which have marked the history1 of
the theory and practice of corporate reorganization, two different conceptions
of the basic postulates on which a reorganization plan should be based, have
emerged. These have come to be known as the "relative priority doctrine"
and the "absolute priority doctrine". In this paper it will be my purpose to
show:
(1) that the generally accepted version of the relative priority doctrine
should be completely rejected, except in the special circumstances to
be described below;
(2) that if a narrow interpretation is placed on the absolute priority
doctrine it would be impractical and would seriously impede the
development of sound reorganization procedures; and
(3) that a broad interpretation of the absolute priority doctrine will pro-
vide the basis for the development of reorganization plans which meet
the requirements of both justice and expediency.
The Relative Priority Doctrine
One of the proponents of the relative priority doctrine, Mr. H. G. Guth-
mann,2 argues as follows:
".. .A reorganization is an attempt to capture the greater values
which it is hoped that the business will have as a going concern over
what it would be worth in liquidation. Where a liquidated business has
a definite sum to distribute, the value of a going concern is uncertain
and a matter of expert estimate. It is the element of uncertainty in future
earning power that gives a market value to stocks even when the size
of prior claims to income are [sic] so great as to leave no appreciable
hope of dividends in the reasonably foreseeable future. The future may
'For an extended discussion of this history, see: BUCHANAN, ECONOMICS OF CoR-
PORATE ENTERPRISE, Part 11 (1940); DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS,
Part V (4th ed. 1941); SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK,
ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COM-
MITTEES, Part VIII, §§ 1-4 (1940); Dean, A Review of the Law of Corporate Re-
organizations, 26 CORNELL L. Q. 537 (1941).2Guthmann, Absolute Priority in Reorganization, 45 COL. L. REV. 739 (1945)
GUTHMANN AND DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY, Ch. 28 (2d ed. 1948).
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always develop an unforeseen profitability, If reorganization is to pre-
serve the security holders' respective interests in the going concern, the
logical sharing in the new securities would be a division on the basis of
the relative value of the old claims against the corporation. Thus, a
preferred stock or an income bond of a corporation that requires re-
organization is rarely worth full par value plus accumulated dividends
or interest arrears; a common stock, while likely to be of low value,
often falls short of being worthless. The shares of such issues in the (let
us say) common stock of the reorganized corporation on the basis of
relative value would give a preponderant portion to the prior issue but
would not wipe out completely the old common. The-valuation of such
interests is a difficult matter, as is the valuation of business as a whole;
but it is a necessary step if the reorganization process is to be a means
of preserving relative position instead of transferring property rights
from junior to senior securities in reorganization."'3
This argument should be rejected on. two grounds; one positive, the other
negaiive. In the first place the argument rests on the invalid assumption
that, because methods of valuation of going concerns are necessarily subject
to uncertainty, it is not reasonable (apparently under any circumstances
whatsoever where the process is one of reorganization and not liquidation)
to eliminate any groups of security holders which happen to feel that they
have any interest in the going concern. Since hope springs eternal in the
human breast, presumably the groups would never be eliminated. But this
argument involves a fundamental misconception regarding the nature of the
valuation process. Perhaps an example from another sphere will help to
illuminate the problem: assume that you are attempting to evaluate the op-
portunity of throwing dice on the condition that if you throw a seven you get
$100, if you throw a twelve you get $5000, for any other throw you get
, nothing. Clearly your evaluation of that opportunity will depend not only
on the fairly good chance of throwing a seven, but also on the much smaller
chance of turning up two sixes. If the latter possibility is ruled out, your
evaluation of the opportunity will drop. Similarly with the evaluation of a
going concern or of any claims against a going concern. The value is deter-
mined not only by the fairly good chance of making "average" returns, but
also by the smaller possibilities that profits may be very large, or, on the
other hand, may be negative. In the case of the going concern, the neat
mathematical probabilities which inhere in the dice situation are not present.
As has been pointed out many times in the history of economic thought,
there is an immeasurable uncertainty regarding the future of a business
3 GUrTHMANN AND DOUGALL, CoRPoRATE FINANCIAL PoLicy 610 (2d ed. 1948).
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enterprise. But this fact does not rule out the possibility of considering the
relative probabilities of various patterns of future earnings and making an
estimate of value for reorganization purposes which will, in the light of then
current knowledge, be at least in the correct order of magnitude. The im-
possibility of making valuations which are accurate to the cent is no basis on
which to found a general principle which would in fact create interests for
groups which have clearly and in all equity lost all previous claims against
the concern because of the priority of other claims which far exceed in
amount any reasonable valuation of the concern in question.4
There will still be borderline cases; in these the courts and regulatory
bodies will have to make a decision one way or the other-a decision which
is certain to be slightly unfair to one group or the other in the vast majority
of such cases. But the injustice is slight and unavoidable, and in other than
borderline cases the problem will not arise. Nor will the fact that the passage
of time may prove the estimates to have been overly optimistic or overly
pessimistic have any bearing on the situation. Valuation must be carried out
at a given point in time. The value will almost inevitably change as events
unfold themselves. But if the valuation is carried out as carefully as pos-
sible, that is all that can be expected; if that valuation is inadequate to meet
the prior claims, the junior claims are shown thereby to have no further
equitable interest in the concern.
This brings us to our second point-the fact that acceptance of the relative
priority doctrine in its current version involves a nullification in large part
of the contractual rights which the bondholder is supposed to receive in re-
turn for the limitation on his share in profits. It would turn bonds into prior
preferred stocks with questionable rights on liquidation.
There may be some point in arguing that corporations would be better off
in the long run (in many if not all instances) if they issued no obligations
involving fixed charges. But to argue, as Guthmann does, that having issued
such obligations, the holders of same have no equitable right to enforce such
claims, apparently on the grounds that the stockholder or other junior claim-
ants do not like it, seems a little strange. If the stockholders wish to have
the privilege of trading on the equity, surely they should be forced to accept
the risks which accompany such a policy. It is true that reorganization is
4The opinion of the Supreme Court in Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 318 U. S.
448, 476, 63 Sup. Ct. 692, 713 (1942), is comparable. For a sound justification of the
use of prospective earning power as the prime determinant of value for reorganization
purposes, see the Court's opinion in Group of Investors v. Milwaukee R. Co., 318 U. S.
523, 540, 63 Sup. Ct. 727, 738 (1942).
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an attempt to maximize the value of the assets of the concern by keeping
it on, or returning it to, a going-concern basis; but it may well be that the
going-concern value after reorganization is inadequate to meet the fixed
contractual claims of the senior claimants; if such is the case, it is difficult
to see how any justification can be found for giving any interest to the junior
claimants. The senior claimants did not contract for a proportionate share
in the assets-they contracted for a given absolute share, and there seems
to be no reason why that should not be their right in law and equity.
Guthman seems to have particularly in mind instances of reorganization
which are instigated by management, not because default has already oc-
curred or is imminent, but because the capital structure is deemed to be
unsound in some way or other. The implication is that they are attempting
to improve the efficiency of the concern but that such desirable action will
be avoided because it would involve the danger that stockholders would be
unfairly wiped out in the process. This line of reasoning may be based on
the assumption that the courts or regulatory bodies will be biased towards
low valuations, but I see no reason why there is not an equal chance that
the bias will be in the opposite direction. To my knowledge the history of
reorganizations does not indicate any particular bias on the part of the courts
toward undervaluation. Mr. justice Douglas' dicta in the Los Angeles Lumber
case may indicate some personal tendency on his part in this direction, es-
pecially with respect to intangibles, but I do not think that one can generalize
too far on this basis.
On the other hand, Guthmann may be basing his analysis on a basic
distinction between voluntary and involuntary reorganization, a distinction
which takes on considerable significance in the light of the facts of the Los
Angeles case. The essence of this argument would be that there is a need
for distinguishing between a- voluntary reorganization-perhaps one could
call it a "formal composition"-and involuntary reorganization. That is,
where the stockholders or other junior claimants can show that there is no
danger of bankruptcy in the foreseeable future in the sense of inability to
meet maturing obligations, that they have certain rights to control and to
share in uncertain future profits-rights which therefore are valuable-, but
that a reorganization is desirable and is in the best interests of all concerned,
there should be some procedure, quite separate and distinct from formal
bankruptcy proceedings, which would take account of these facts, would not
wipe out the junior claimants even though the value of the assets were found
to be less than the prior .claims, and would provide machinery for preventing
[Vol. 33
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obstructionist tactics by small minority groups.5
A simplified example may help to bring out the point. Assume a corpo-
ration whose assets have:
1 chance in 10 of being worth $1 million
2 chances in 10 " . . 10 "
4 .' cc 10 cc .. . 15 "
2 cc . c 10 . . "' 20 "
1 c h a n c e " 1 0 .. .. 2 9 "
and that a reasonable valuation of the assets would be $15 million. Assume
further that the corporation has bonds outstanding of $15,100,000; that it
is currently earning its interest by a slight margin ; and that it has a fairly
large cash account so that it could meet interest payments for several years
despite a subsequent decline in earnings. In this situation the stockholders,
looking to the distant future when the bonds will mature, wish to effect a
reorganization which will put the corporation on a sounder financial basis.
It seems indisputable that in such a situation the stockholders' claims would
have real value despite the current excess of liabilities over the real value of
the assets, for though the chances are 7 in 10 that they will be worth nothing,
there are 2 chances in 10 that they will be worth $4,900,000, .and 1 chance
in 10 that they will be worth $13,900,000. Moreover there are current earn-
ings available for dividends. Similarly the real value of the bonds will be
less than the face value, for though there are 7 chances in 10 that they will
get the face value, there are 3 chances in ten that they will not.
Thus we reach the astonishing and apparently paradoxical conclusion that
if the corporation can continue to pay interest on its bonds, the bondholders'
claims will be worth less than $15 million. If the corporation cannot meet
5It is most unfortunate that the SEC and the Court took the Los Angeles case and
attempted to create a general pattern for reorganization proceedings from the distorted
material which it provided. The sharp increase in value of the assets which took place
between the time when the proceedings were started and Nov., 1939, and, what is more
important for our argument above, the existence of the agreement not to foreclose prior
to 1944 which had been drawn up in the 6arly 1930's, provide effective ammunition
for those who oppose the general principle on which the decision was based. For while
it may be that the rights accorded to the stockholders by the plan which had been
accepted by the lower courts was too generous, there seems to be no basis in equity
for excluding them completely. Mr. Justice Douglas asserted that the right to delay
foreclosure had been lost as a result of the instigation of bankruptcy proceedings, but
this argument is questionable to say the least. I am indebted to Professor Arthur John
Keeffe for a helpful discussion of this point.6This of course is quite conceivable, for the rate at which the earnings are capitalized
will normally exceed the interest rate on the bonds.
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its interest payments, the bondholders can force the corporation into bank-
ruptcy and will under their contract be entitled to receive the full face value
of their claims.
Paradoxical or not, this is the result of the facts of the situation, and it
would seem to follow that a "formal composition" would be fair and equitable
which granted the bondholders new securities worth considerably less than
$15,100,000 and granted to the stockholders securities of real value. This
does not mean acceptance of the relative priority doctrine when the reorgani-
zation is involuntary-the fact that proceedings are instigated by the debtor
does not prove that the reorganization is voluntary; to be voluntary the pos-
sibility of bankruptcy must be remote-; nor does it mean that a majority
or even a significant minority of the bondholders should b3e forced to accept
a plan of this sort; but it does point to the necessity for formal machinery
which would force obstructionist minorities-so-called "strikers"-to accept
a plan which is equitable and is in the best interests of the consuming public.7
For this type of case a modified relative priority doctrine may have some
application, but unfortunately the supporters of the doctrine have attempted
to apply it to all types of reorganization.
The proponents of the relative priority doctrine have buttressed their posi-
tive arguments for the doctrine by attempts to show that implementation
of the absolute priority doctrine would be unwise on two important counts.
First they suggest that it would constitute a "special hazard to the stock-
holders of a borrowing corporation" s which would increase the costs of or
even make impossible the equity financing which is needed in order to main-
tain a sound financial structure for American industry. If stockholders have
been investing on the assumption that reorganization, if and when necessary,
would be carried out in accord with the relative doctrine, then certainly the
emphatic decision to enforce senior claimants' contractual rights will mean
an increase in the costs of equity financing. But I do not see why it should
make it impossible, and there is surely no objection to a rise in the returns
on equity, if it is necessary to cover the risks involved.9
7This is simply a logical extension of the attitude already adopted by the SEC to-
ward reorganizations under the PUBLIc UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY AcT OF 1935, 49
STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 (1940). See'FEDERAL WATER SERVICE CORPORATION,
SEC HOLDING COMPANY AcT RELEASE No. 2365, March 24, 1941. See also the interest-
ing discussion by Dean, A Review of the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 26 CORNELL
L. Q. 537, 564-574 (1941).5 GuTHIMANN AND DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 611 (2d ed. 1948).9For a different view see Dean, A Review of the Law of Corporate Reorganzationw,
26 CORNELL L. Q. 537, 563-564 (1941). However, his argument is based on a narrow
interpretation of the absolute doctrine, for he assumes that under the rule no special
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Second, they argue that implementation of the absolute doctrine would
make impossible the acquisition of new cash or the retention of able manage-
ment on the best possible terms. Before considering these points in detail
we must define carefully what is meant by the "absolute priority doctrine".
The Absolute Priority Doctrine
It must be emphasized at the start of an analysis of the absolute doctrine
that it means many things to many persons. However it does seem possible
to specify two main types of interpretation and to classify the various inter-
pretations as variants of one of these two main types. All interpreters would
agree on the fundamental tenet that, "The stockholder's interest in the prop-
erty is subordinate to the rights of creditors; first of secured and then of
unsecured creditors".1 0 The central difference of opinion revolves around
the question of the determination of the thing to which these creditors' rights
apply. Specifically the point is: do the creditors have a legal and equitable
right to the full going-concern value of the reorganized corporation, even
though the cooperation of other groups is necessary to achieve that result;
or is their absolute right limited to that part of the value of the reorganized
concern which they have contributed? If the latter view is accepted, how
are the contributions of the respective groups to be evaluated?
Most of the criticism of the absolute doctrine has assumed that it was the
former narrow view of the doctrine that was adopted and set forth by the
Supreme Court in the long series of cases which came before that body. If
this were so the criticism would indeed be well merited, and it is a fact that
the language of the Court does leave considerable room for disagreement as
to what the learned judges did mean. It seems reasonably clear to the writer,
particularly in the light of many of the dicta which accompanied these de-
cisions, that, at least in most cases, the Court was feeling its way toward
the broader interpretation, though at times, e.g., the Boyd case, it may have
seemed closer to the narrow one. Let us assume that the critics were right
in their interpretation of the Court's decisions and consider the validity of
their criticism.
As we have suggested above, there are two conditions under which the
absolute doctrine was said to be unwise or impractical:
treatment could be given to junior claimants, whereas the Westernt Pacific case offers
a recent example of the many instances in which the Supreme Court has recognised the
justice of granting special rights to junior claimants who contribute new cash. Ecker
v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 318 U. S. 448, 486, 487, 63 Sup. Ct. 692, 713 (1942).
'
0 Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. Co., 174 U. S. 674,
684, 19 Sup. Ct. 827, 830 (1898).
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(1) when a considerable amount of new cash or other" property was
needed to effect a successful reorganization;
(2) when it was desirable to retain a management which owned consider-
able amounts of junior claims.
Swaine has explained the first point very well.
". - -While conceding that stockholders may be admitted to some
interest in the new company [it has been] urged that the fair value of
this participation must not be in excess of the amount of the stock-
holders' assessments. . . When it appears, as it did in the Missouri
Pacific case, that junior bondholders and unsecured creditors are to re-
ceive preferred stock which is selling at 53, while common stockholders,
upon payment of a net assessment of $17 per share, are to get stock
selling at $30, it is argued that the difference-here $13 per share of
common stock-represents "a substantial equity" in the property which
has been unlawfully diverted from the creditors for the benefit of the
stockholders. This argument has never been successfully maintained,
and, in fact, could not be maintained without making successful corporate
reorganizations impossible. Bondholders do not, as a rule, enforce their
strict right of foreclosure and buy in the property for their sole benefit,
because they are unwilling to put up the new money which is usually
essential fo the continued life of the enterprise. Stockholders constitute
the best, and often the only, available source of new money, and their
participation is essential. That participation can be obtained only by a
plan which gives the stockholders something of definite value over and
above what they pay for .... The answer to the argument that this con-
stitutes an appropriation to the stockholders of a substantial equity in
the property, which should be used to pay the creditors in full, is that
this equity is largely attributable to the fact that the stockholders are
willing to put more money into the property; and that if they were not
willing to do this,-if the plan were not made reasonably attractive to
them,-the 'substantial equity' would disappear.":"
A simplified example may bring out the point more clearly. If the liqui-
dation value of the assets of a corporation are $10,000, whereas their value
on a going-concern basis, if $2,000 working capital is supplied, would be
$15,000, to whom belongs the $3,000 difference? Without the $2,000 work-
ing capital, it would not exist; but, similarly, the $2,000 working capital
alone is worth but $2,000. It is apparent that we have here one of those
cases where on economic grounds there is no basis for logical imputation.
.If the capital market were perfect, the difference would go to the owners
of the assets, but the capital market, and particularly the market for equities
"lSwaine, Corporate Reorganizations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, 27
COL. L. REv. 901, 914-916 (1927).
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or for debt of bankrupt corporations, is far from perfect. If the corporation
is to be reorganized, some part, perhaps the major part, of the difference
will, as a matter of practical necessity, have to be offered to the suppliers
of new cash. If less has to be offered to holders of old junior securities than
would have to be offered to induce the general public to purchase-whether
or not this will be so will depend on the circumstances of the case-the senior
creditors are to that extent better off to make the offer to the junior security
holders.
It has been argued that this line of reasoning is invalid because:
". .. The managers of the reorganization must be assured, and not
merely hopeful, that the new money will be forthcoming, and where the
stock is scattered a bank underwriting of the offer must be obtained.
With such a banking commitment the offer to stockholders ceases to *
be a method of getting money from them and becomes a method of giving
them a valuable right. Under these circumstances the motive is the
desire to see the former owners retain part of their original investment.' 2
Whether or not the motive suggested was the prime one influencing the
actions of the reorganization managers I am obviously in no position to know,
but certainly the existence of such a motive does not necessarily follow from
the procedure of underwriting. It may well have been that the underwriters,
who usually desire to dispose of the issues as rapidly as possible, might have
agreed to a higher price if the issue were to be offered by rights than they
would if it were to be sold to the general public.
The offer to junior security holders of the right to purchase stock in the
reorganized corporation at a figure below its "real value" does not preserve
their interest. Their original interest has been eliminated; they have acquired
new interests by their contribution of cash, and the importance of liquidity
is such that they are able to claim a greater proportion of the total assets
than their dollar contribution bears to the dollar value of the rehabilitated
assets. An equal if not greater proportion would have to be offered if the
offer were made to outsiders. Thus so long as the price is not unreasonably
lower than that which is necessary to induce them to purchase, the offer of
rights to former junior security holders is both just and practical.
Bonbright and Bergermann, while conceding that such action might be
justified as a practical expedient, assert that the "junior security holders
1 2
FINLETTER, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY 413414
(1937), quoted in SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDYo AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, Ac-
TIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COI UTTEES
53-54 (1940).
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should be allowed to participate, not as a matter of legal right, nor even
as a matter of business fairness, but rather as a matter of expediency in
financing the reorganization." 13 I cannot accept this point of view. There
seems no reason why the creditors should have a right, either in law or
equity, to the full going-concern value of the assets after they -have been
rehabilitated by the contribution of new cash. They have an absolute right
to the going-concern value before the contribution of new cash-to the broken
down corporate machine-but in some instances this will be little more than
the liquidation value.14 If the corporation is to be rehabilitated, they have
an equitable right to some part of the increase in the value of the assets.
-Their share in that increase can often be made greater if the junior claimants
, (rather than the general public) are permitted to share in that increase.
Instead of lessening the claims of the senior claimants, the policy of offering
to those who have previously had an interest in the corporation will add
to those claims. The rights of the stockholders are not secured at the expense
of the senior and prior rights of the creditors.
Turning now to the other point of criticism, it is claimed that the absolute
priority doctrine is impractical in situations where "the bulk of the stock
in the corporation to be reorganized is owned by the management interests
and the continued presence of that group in the saddle is essential to creating
the going concern value which makes creditors prefer reorganization to
liquidation."' s It is argued that in many instances the only practical, or at
least by far the best, way of retaining these management interests is by of-
fering them a stock interest, but that this is not possible under the absolute
priority doctrine. If the narrow interpretation of the absolute doctrine were
made, this criticism would be valid. But on the broader interpretation of
the doctrine, the giving of stock or purchase-warrants to management in-
terests is permissible if it is deemed more advantageous to retain able manage-
ment by this method than by means of high salaries, for the action does not
necessarily divert assets from senior creditors. The courts will need to give
very careful scrutiny to plans involving this sort of procedure to prevent the
emergence of fraud, but there is nothing about them which is fraudulent
13Bonbright and Bergermann, Two Rival Theories of -Priority Rights of Security
Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 CoL. L. Rv. 127, 132 (1928).
14This is not to say that where additional cash is not required in order to reorganize
successfully the bankrupt corporation, the creditors are entitled only to the liquidation
value. A sharp distinction must be drawn between cases where cash is and where it is
not needed in order to achieve successful reorganization. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 113, 123, 124, 60 Sup. Ct. 1, 6, 11 (1939).
15 GUTHMANN AND DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 610 (2d ed. 1948).
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per se, or which is inconsonant with the broad interpretation of the absolute
priority doctrine. That part of the value of the assets of the reorganized
corporation which arises from the agreement of the management to work
for nominal salaries does not in any sense belong to the creditors. Indeed
it may be-best to look at the participation granted to owner-management
interests as a promise of compensation for services to be rendered in the
future-compensation which is essentially unconnected with past security
ownership and which is essentially similar to that which might be granted
to the investment bankers for their services in underwriting the issues of the
reorganized corporation.'0
In brief then, the ,narrow interpretation of the absolute doctrine is open
to severe criticism when cash is needed and can be obtained on more reason-
able terms from junior security holders than from the general public, or
where high salaries are an inopportune way of retaining the services of an
owner-management group; however a broad interpretation of the doctrine
-an interpretation which in no way resembles the relative priority doctrine-
is not subject to these criticisms and meets the requirements of justice and
expediency.
It is of some interest that the relative approach as it was originally set
forth by Swaine is very similar to the broad approach which has been set
forth in this article and bears little resemblance to the modern version of
the relative doctrine. In.summing up his argument in the article from which
I have quoted above, Swaine said:
".... The rule as I see it, and as I believe it will ultimately be devel-
oped by the courts, is that the relative priorities of the old securities,
senior to the most junior securities which continue to have any interest
in the property, must not be inequitably disturbed."'17 [Italics supplied.]
Note the obvious implication that no provision is to be made for securities
which have no interest in the property because prior claims have exhausted
the value thereof.
This is vastly different from the interpretation of the theory offered by
most writers in the field. The "distortion" was introduced at a very early
161 am indebted for this suggestion to Mr. Lawrence Wilsey.
'
7 Swaine, Corporate Reorganizations: Certain Develapments of the Last Decade, 27
CoL. L. REv. 901, 907 (1927). This paper was in its present form when two articles
by Swaine in the HARvARD LAw REVmw (1942-1943) came to my attention. They com-
pletely confirm my interpretation of Swaine's original position, and are in almost com-
plete accord with, though they differ considerably in scope and emphasis from, the
analysis of this paper. See Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization under Section
77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 HARv. L. Rzv. 1037 and 1193 (1942-1943).
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date, apparently by Bonbright and Bergermann, and has persisted ever since.
According to Bonbright and Bergermann, the relative priority doctrine as
enunciated by Swaine held that "all that the first mortgage bondholders are
entitled to is an exchange of their old securities for new securities, (a) with
an approximately equal income claim (in the form of fixed or contingent
charges) and (b) with priority over any new securities issued in exchange
for the old junior securities."' s Sometimes one is led to believe that sub-
sequent writers failed to read Swaine and relied on Bonbright's erroneous
interpretation. But whether or not this be true, it is clear that Swaine did
not support a doctrine which "attempts merely to preserve relative interests"
and on the basis of which "even where the common stock appears valueless
some participation has been accorded."' 9 Nor would I agree with Buchanan
that, "The relative rule [as laid down by Swaine] would insist that fairness
is achieved in reorganization plans provided the parties in interest are left
undisturbed in the order of priority of claims on income. . . . Strictly ap-
plied this would mean that no group of claimants would ever be wiped out
entirely.... -20
What Swaine was trying to say was that, having decided that a certain
number of classes of claimants have in fact an equity in the assets of the
corporation, there is no injustice involved, per se, in altering the contracts
of any of the classes so long as the relative priority of their claims is un-
disturbed and each is given a claim to his fair share of the total net assets.
This point was clearly recognised in the Consolidated Rock Products case
where it was said, "The substitution of a simple, conservative capital struc-
ture for a highly complicated one may be a primary requirement of any re-
organization plan. There is no necessity to construct the new capital structure
on the framework of the old."
2 1
in addition Swaine wished to make the point (which I have stressed above)
that in order to increase the value of the assets it may be necessary under
certain circumstances-if new cash can best be obtained from former junior
security holders or if owner-management should be retained-to share that
increase with those who make it possible; but that this is completely inde-
pendent, conceptually, of the problem of adjusting the contractual rights of
18Bonbright and Bergermann, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security
Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COL. L. REv. 127, 130-132 (1928).
1 9 GUTHM ANN AND DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY, 684-685 (1st ed. 1940).
2 0 BUCHANAN, EcoNOICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 381-382 (1940).21Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 531, 61 Sup. Ct. 675, 687
(1940).
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the various claimants in order that a sound financial structure be created
for the reorganized corporation.
The unfortunate consequence of the general acceptance of the "current
version" of the relative priority doctrine is that it is conceived as the only
logical alternative to the narrow version of the absolute docrine. Thus, be-
cause the absolute doctrine in its narrow version (which would not permit
the subscribers of new capital, if they happened to be former junior security
holders, to obtain a share in the reorganized corporation greater than the
proportion which their cash contribution bears to the value of the reorganized
corporation), is obviously impractical in certain circumstances, while the
relative priority doctrine in its "current version" would arbitrarily nullify
the contractual rights of the creditors the attitude most commonly adopted
is that justice must be tempered with expediency tm-that complete justice is
impossible. I have tried to show that a broad interpretation of the absolute
priority doctrine-an interpretation which is strikingly similar to Swaine's
original version of the relative priority doctrine-meets the criteria both of
justice and expediency.
It may be instructive to consider the application of this broad interpretation
to an actual case of reorganization, for example, the Brown Co. reorganization
which, according to Dewing, "shows how difficult it is to apply an absolute
rule of justice to the exigencies of actual reorganization."2
This plan gave Ys of a share of new common stock to holders of the original
common, and 12Y2 shares of new common for each $100 of old preferred,
while giving the old bondholders $600 of 5% "cumulative bonds" and $650
par value of new 6%o convertible preferred for each $1252.80 of principal
and accumulated interest. This was done even though "the common stock
had no value on the basis either of past earnings or of assets."24 Could this
plan be considered just? In this instance the problem is not complicated
by the desire to obtain new cash. The answer to the question depends on
the value of the assets of the reorganized corporation on a going-concern
basis, i.e., on expected future earnings, and on the extent to which that value
is due to the retention of the owner-management group (which in this
instance owned virtually all the outstanding common stock).
The past earnings which Dewing considered were indeed dismal, but they
22See e.g., Buchanan's treatment. BUCUANAN, ECONOIICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE,
Chapters XIII and XIV (1940).23This case is considered at some length in DEwING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPO-
RATIONS 1486-1499 (4th ed. 1940).
241d. at 1496.
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were the result of a catastrophic cyclical depression in which the pulp and
paper industry generally was very severely hit. The increase in the price
of pulp in October, 1939, the reduction of foreign competition resulting from
the war and the general revival of business in late 1938 and 1939, all presaged
a brighter future for Brown Co. If the estimates of value indicated the
existence of an equity for the common of the order of magnitude of that
which they were in fact given, then, even apart from the value of the manage-
ment factor, the plan was just. The mere fact that the rights of the bond-
holders were changed does not necessarily indicate any sacrifice on their part.
If they have a claim worth $25,000,00025 against assets worth $30,000,000,
they make no sacrifice if, after the reorganization, they still have prior en-
forceable claims worth $25,000,000. In most cases the form of the claims
cannot remain unchanged if the corporation is to be rehabilitated.
Moreover, in this case, the value .of the assets may have been due, in part
at least, to the retention of management, so that this factor too would have
justified the granting of some share in the reorganized concern to the manage-
ment interests.
In short, contrary to Dewing's claim, there is nothing inconsistent in. the
S.E.C.'s attitude as reflected in its brief in the Los Angeles Lunber case on
the one hand, and its implicit approval of the Brown Co. reorganization on
the other. The broad interpretation of the absolute priority doctrine (and
it is this broad interpretation which the S. E. C. appears to have adopted)
offers room for theworking out of reorganization plans which are both equi-
table and practical. In view of Dewing's comments on this case it should
perhaps be repeated that the fairness of a plan cannot be judged on the basis
of hindsight; windfall profits or losses which occur after a plan has been
confirmed cannot be used as evidence to prove that a plan was not fair when
it was confirmed.
An interesting point arises here. It would seem that the going-concern
value of a corporation depends to a considerable extent on the nature of its
capital structure. Thus, if a corporation has a capital structure composed
50% of bonds and 50% of equity, its assets would clearly be of less value
25In view of the attitude displayed by some of the courts and regulatory bodies, and
even by certain professional writers in the field of corporation finance, it is perhaps
necessary to emphasize that a bond with a face value of $1000 may be worth much
more or much less than $1000 depending on the relation between the market rate of
interest for securities involving similar risk factors and the rate of interest on the bond
itself, and on the maturity of the bond, not to mention a variety of other factors which
may be of importance in certain special circumstances. On this point see the interesting
comments in Gerdes, General Prnciples of Plans of Reorganization, 89 U. oF PA. L. REV.
39, 47, 48 (1940).
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than identical physical assets owned by a corporation with a capital structure
composed entirely of equity, were it not for the reduction in taxes which
bond interest permits. This fact follows from the absence of any future pos-
sibility of bankruptcy proceedings or other embarrassment arising out of the
fixed charges.26 In the absence of the tax complication then, the greater the
reduction in fixed charges that is achieved, the greater would be the value
available for satisfying the claims of the junior claimants, so that, in fairness
to the latter, complete elimination of fixed charges would be called for. On
the other hand, certain investors, both individual and institutional, are un-
willing or unable to hold large quantities of junior securities, so that any
attempt completely to remove fixed charges might produce a heavy selling
of the junior securities and a consequent reduction in their market price
which would injure both the former bondholders and the former stockholders.
Certainly fixed charges should be reduced to a level which, in the light of
the best available estimates of future circumstances, can be safely borne by
the company; so much is necessary in order to save the company from the
expense of future reorganization. Whether or not the adjustment of fixed
charges should be pushed farther, will depend on the relative importance of
the loss in tax savings and the danger of adversely affecting the market price
of the new equity securities on the one hand, and the increased flexibility
and safety which would result from the elimination of fixed charges on the
other.
A further point which bears consideration is the justice of the growing
practice of granting warrants to the common stockholders for whom no equity
in the corporation's assets exists on the basis of a reasonable valuation. This
practice is usually justified on the grounds that since the Valuation is un-
certain and there may be some equity for the stockholders if certain favorable
occurrences take place, they should be given a right to participate in case
the favorable occurrences should in fact take place. This function is served,
it is said, by giving them warrants. If the conservative valuation should turn
out to be correct, they would have no claim; but if the most optimistic hopes
were realized, they would be able to claim their fair participation.2 7  This
2 6The opposite conclusion is reached by GUTHMANN AND DOUGALL, CORPORATE Fi-
NANCIAL POLicY 607, 608 (2d ed. 1948), but this is clearly the result of their quite
arbitrary choice of capitalization factors. The general consensus that a financial struc-
ture composed entirely of equity is sounder than a mixed structure is so overwhelming
that it is very surprising that they would depart from it on the basis of such weak-
indeed, of quite indefensible-argument.271n Ecker v. Western Pacific' R. Corp., 318 U. S. 448, 476, 63 Sup. Ct. 692, 713(1942), the Court said, "After all reasonable value had been exhausted by senior se-
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argument involves the fundamental error of the relative priority approach,
namely, it overlooks the fact that value is the resultant of weighing the prob-
ability of the occurrence of both favorable and unfavorable developments.
If the possibility of gain from some favorable development were in large
part eliminated, the value of the claims would be to that extent eliminated.
Certainly the market often gives a value to warrants which is independent
of the most probable expectation regarding future earnings. If such valuable
warrants are given to the junior security holders when the value of the assets
is insufficient fully to compensate the senior security holders, it is an un-
warranted diversion of value, for the issue of warrants will not supply cash
when it is needed-at the time of reorganization-but only if and when the
corporation is successfully rehabilitated and highly prosperous and probably
is in no need of cash.
This is not to say that warrants to purchase stock over some future period
should never be issued during a process of reorganization. There may be
instances, though they are probably rare, where they may be appropriate,
e.g., the owner-management situation, but in general they seem to fill no real
function and their issue has frequently been defended by reasoning which
rests on a misconception of the valuation process.
Conclusion
In summary, it would seem desirable that the courts and regulatory bodies
adopt the broad interpretation of the absolute priority doctrine. Specifically:
1. If the problem of raising cash from junior security holders or of re-
taining the services of an owner-management group is not present, the only
problem is that of valuation of the assets on a going-concern basis. If the
valuation indicates any equity for the junior security holders, they should
be accorded their residual share, and the fact that certain rights of the senior
security holders must be changed is of no consequence so long as they receive
property or claims equal in real value to their former claims-in the words
of the Supreme Court in the Milwaukee case-so long as they receive "the
equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered. '28 ,
curities, warrants might have been authorized for otherwise unsatisfied claims." But on
the other hand, in the Milwaukee case we are told that "Only 'meticulous regard for
earning capacity' (Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 525, 61
Sup. Ct. 675 (1940) can afford the old security holders protection against a dilution
of their priorities. . . ." Group of Investors v. Milwaukee R. Co., 318 U. S. 523, 541,
63 Sup. Ct. 727, 738 (1942). It is to be hoped that the Court has now recognized that
the first statement is untenable if the second is adcepted at its face value, but its
opinion in the Milwaukee case does not justify great optimism on this score.28Group of Investors v. Milwaukee R. Co., 318 U. S. 523, 566, 63 Sup. Ct. 727, 749
(1942).
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2. If cash must be raised, and if it can be raised more "cheaply" from
junior security holders than from any other source, the fact that said security
holders are granted a share in the going-concern value which is greater than
the proportion which their cash contribution bears to the going-concern value,
should not be construed as diverting value from the senior security holders,
but rather as increasing the absolute size of the share of the senior security
holders. Similar "rights" should be granted to all security holders.
3. If in the case of owner-managed corporations, the retention of
management will increase the going-concern value, the fact that part of the
increase must be given to the management in the form of common stock or
warrants should not be construed as diverting value from senior security
holders, the only qualification being that laid down in the Los Angeles
Lumber case, namely, that convincing evidence of the value of continued
owner-management must be presented, and that the participation granted be
not excessive. The fact that rights are granted to one class of junior security
holders does not, in this case, necessitate the granting of similar rights to
other such groups.
The recommendations outlined above appear to meet the canons of justice
and expediency for "involuntary" reorganization. They would obviate the
practical difficulties inhering in the attempt to apply the narrow version of
the absolute doctrine,- and would avoid the serious errors of the relative
approach when it is applied to "involuntary" reorganizations. The only pos-
sible objection to this broad absolute priority approach would seem to be the
difficulty of some of the valuation problems which are involved; but as the
S. E. C. has said, "The difficulty of valuation is not a pertinent argument
against attempting valuation; the choice is between having or not having
objective standards for determining the fairness of reorganization plans-
an issue which the Supreme Court has now resolved beyond further
question."3 0
Finally, a new reorganization procedure should be established which would
leave the door open for "formal compositions" and would provide a means
for preventing the obstructionist tactics of minority groups who might try
to enforce the absolute rule even though its application would mean serious
injustice to junior claimants.
290n this point see BUCHANAN, EcoNomics OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 383-389 (1940).
3oSEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND IIVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIEs, PER-
SONNEL AND FUNcTIoNs OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COiiITTEEs 156 (1940).
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